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Introduction
The unexpected results of Tunisian legislative elections held in Sep-
tember and October 2019 reshuffled a highly contested political 
system and renewed a political elite accused of forgetting the claims 
and grievances raised by the 2011 revolution. Notably, popular dis-
content against Tunisian political elite grew in the wake of the 
inedited compromise between the Islamist party Ennahdha and the 
neo-bourghibist party Nidaa Tounès, which had faced each other in a 
crescent polarized landscape between 2012 and 2014. 
While the success of the Tunisian democratic transition seemed to 
hinge on this “twin toleration” compromise between Islamists and 
Secularists (Stepan 2012; 2018) some scholars warned about the det-
rimental effects of a “rotten compromise” on Tunisian democracy 
(Marzouqi 2015; Boubekeur, 2016). Indeed, on the one hand, this 
compromise led to a fragmentation of secularist forces (Nidaa Tounès, 
Machrou’ Tounès, Tahya Tounès), on the other hand, Islamists, tradi-
tionally considered as a monolithic bloc, have suffered electoral losses 
and faced new challengers questioning Ennahdha’s alliance with the 
actors of the old regime. 
These dynamics have paved the way towards the 2019 electoral results, 
which have weakened the incumbent political parties. We argue that 
this transformation cannot be understood through the mainstream 
Islamists vs. Secularists cleavage, due to the emergence of new polit-
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Ennahdha’s Transformation and the 
Political Landscape Between 2011 and 
2019
After the fall of the authoritarian regime and the victory 
of Ennahda at the first free elections in October 2011, 
the priority for the Islamist party Ennahdha was to inte-
grate itself in the democratic game. This became evident 
when Ennahdha, in search for a common ground with 
secular forces in the name of national cohesion, entered 
in a coalition government with the secular parties CPR 
(Congrès pour la République) and Ettakatol (November 
2011-November 2014). 
This coalition government triggered high discontent 
amongst other secularist forces which organized them-
selves around the neo-bourghibist party Nidaa Tounès 
(Call for Tunisia) with the objective of blocking the rising 
power of the Islamist party. Founded in 2012 by Beji Qaid 
Essebsi and including veterans of the old regime, Nidaa 
Tounès emerged as a platform for secular forces to fight 
the “Islamization of the country”. This prompted a period 
of high polarization (2012-2014).  
In the aftermath of the political assassinations of two 
leftist activists and the military coup in Egypt in July 
2013, Tunisia experienced a deep political crisis which 
further delegitimized the Islamist party in power. In 
order to survive in the political arena, Ennahda under-
took a series of actions aiming at seeking legitimacy from 
secular forces (and the international community as well). 
Firstly, it drastically cut its ties with Salafi organizations 
and agreed to relinquish power in favor of a technocratic 
government in January 2014. The fracture with Salafi 
actors became evident when the Salafi-jihadist organi-
zation Ansar al-Sharia was declared a terrorist group in 
August 2013. From this moment, Ennahda’s discourse 
revolved around its detachment from radical Islam and a 
reference to democratic values.
The outcome of the 2014 elections, establishing the vic-
tory of the party Nidaa Tounès, paved the way for an 
unexpected coalition government between two confron-
tational forces.  Ennahda’s willingness to compromise 
with actors of the old regime was not only demonstrated 
by its agreement to join a national unity government led 
by Nidaa Tounès, but also by approving a controversial 
law granting amnesty to officials accused of corruption 
during the Ben Ali’s regime (the so-called “Reconcili-
ation law”). The political agreement between the two 
political forces was perceived by the majority of Tunisian 
electorate as a betrayal of the principles of the revolution. 
This led the main challengers of this “rotten compro-
mise” to denounce an uneven democratization process 
(Marzouqi 2015) overly focused on seeking consensus at 
the expense of translating revolutionary grievances into 
concrete socioeconomic policies. 
For several analysts, discontent grew further after Ennah-
dha’s self-proclaimed transformation from an Islamist 
party to a Muslim Democrat party in 2016, in an attempt 
to move toward the center of the political spectrum. Th is 
“raises the question of whether a new Islamist party will 
emerge to challenge Ennahdha from the right.” (Grewal 
2018), given that disappointed Islamist voters “may seek 
an alternative party that provides a clearer articulation of 
pro-Islamist—albeit far more extreme—positions, such 
as Jebhat Islah and Hizb al-Tahrir” (Yerkes 2018). “Exiting 
political Islam could well create a vacuum that would 
benefit other, more fundamentalist groups or Salafist 
movements” (Meddeb 2019) who could provide political 
representation for conservative voters that currently feel 
abandoned by Ennahdha. The emerging political force 
Itilaf al-Karama has been depicted as embodying the new 
radical Islamist challenger.1 
The Rise of Itilaf al-Karama After the 2019 
Elections
At the legislative elections last October, the new political 
group Itilaf al-Karama  (Coalition of Dignity) surpris-
ingly emerged as the 4th largest force (21 seats) in Par-
liament behind Ennahdha (52 seats), Qalb Tounès (38) 
and the Democratic Current (22). The coalition has 
been depicted by the media as “integrists with a Salafi 
tendency”,2 mostly on the basis that its designated leader 
is Seif Eddine Makhlouf, known as the “Jihadis’ lawyer”,3 
1. Mathieu Galtier, « Tunisie : la coalition al-Karama, un mistigri 
islamiste au Parlement », Middle East Eye, 29/10/2019, online: 
https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/reportages/tunisie-la-coalition-al-
karama-un-mistigri-islamiste-au-parlement
2. Marie Verdier, « En Tunisie, les islamistes d’Ennahdha croient en 
une possible majorité », La Croix, 09/10/2019, online: https://www.
la-croix.com/Monde/Afrique/En-Tunisie-islamistes-dEnnahdha-
croient-possible-majorite-2019-10-09-1201053050
3. “Surnommé “l’avocat des terroristes”, Me Seifeddine Makhlouf 
candidat à la présidentielle”, Kapitalis, 02/08/2019, online:http://
kapitalis.com/tunisie/2019/08/02/surnomme-lavocat-des-terrori-
stes-me-seifeddine-makhlouf-candidat-a-la-presentielle/
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and supported by the dissolved “Salafi” Leagues for the 
Protection of the Revolution (LPR).4 
Interviews with Itilaf al-Karama members, however, 
reveal the heterogeneous nature of the coalition, which 
brings together (1) ex-members of the LPR, both from 
Islamic or Leftist backgrounds,5 (2) the Tunisian Organi-
zation for Work (al-Munazhamah al-Tunisiyyah li-l-
Shughl) led by Muhammad al-As’ad ‘Abid,6 (3) human 
rights defenders (lawyers, journalists, bloggers, etc) and 
former members of the constituent assembly such as Najib 
Murad and Ahmad al-Sami’i, (4) ex-nahdhawi Islamists, 
(5) the Islamist Justice and Development Party led by 
‘Abd al-Razzab bin ‘Arabi, (6) the Salafi party Jabhat al-
Islah and (7) some independent ‘scientific’ Salafi sheikhs. 
The Congress for the Republic Party (CPR), formerly led 
by the ex-president Moncef Marzouqi, also episodically 
joined the coalition in May-June.7 
This heterogeneity indicates that the main goal of the 
coalition is to gather those political forces excluded or 
dissatisfied from precedent choices of the political elite 
in power, rather than mobilizing radical forces upon reli-
gious or sectarian premises. Even Ennahdha’s members 
who left the party have acknowledged that the reason 
they joined the new coalition was beyond religious 
motivations. Indeed, they agreed with the leadership’s 
decision to separate religion from politics, but they did 
not forgive the pragmatic compromise with old-regime 
political forces. As a former Ennahdha’s member stated, 
“I can’t make compromise with those people that tor-
tured me and my family during the authoritarian regime. 
Ennahdha made alliances with them. So, I joined Itilaf 
4. « La LTPC, matrice islamo-révolutionnaire de Kaïs Saïed », 
Maghreb Confidentiel n°1355, 26/10/2019
5. In a communiqué, the LPR declares joining Itilaf al-Karama 
because it is “the closest initiative to what we believe in” i.e. “Sov-
ereignty, independence, emancipation, dignity and the defense of 
the Arab Islamic identity, considered sacred red lines that should 







al-Karama because I want to recover my dignity”.8 The 
coalition thus displays a strong hostility to the “Adminis-
trative Reconciliation Law”, which allowed for the return 
of ex-former regime supporters late 2017.
According to its secretary-general Seif Eddine Makhlouf, 
the coalition’s purpose is “the unification of the revolu-
tionary camp”.9 In a Facebook-spread communication, 
the coalition clearly states that its “relation with the rest 
of the elements of the current [socio-political] scene is 
based on a very strict and clear separation between the 
national forces that have an interest in the continuation 
of the revolution and the success of its project, and the 
forces of reaction, backwardness and lackeys of dicta-
torship and external domination” and that it intends 
to “form a complete national network of actors known 
for their loyalty to the revolution and their deep affilia-
tion with the concerns of its people and the defence of 
its identity, its values and its aspirations”.10 It also relies 
on a sovereigntist rhetoric denouncing the interference 
of Western powers in Tunisian politics, the imposition 
of a Western model of governance, and the spoliation of 
the natural wealth of the country. According to coalition’s 
voters at the last elections: “ Itilaf al-Karma is the new 
political force bringing back dignity to Tunisian people, 
it will implement all the revolutionary changes that 
Ennahdha was not able to do, because it was too submis-
sive vis-à-vis the old regime’s people and the diktat of the 
international community, France in particular”.11 
Itilaf al-Karama’s revolutionary project also relies on 
the recuperation of traditional values and institutions 
neglected by the old regime in the framework of national 
reforms inspired to a Western model of modern state. 
However, far from providing a radical Islamist alternative 
to Ennahda, as some analysts warned, Itilaf al-Karama 
voices conservative demands that emphasize identity and 
values rather than the implementation of sharia norms. 
8. Interview by Ester Sigillò with a former Ennahdha’s member, 
Tunis, October 2019. 
9. https://www.facebook.com/matar.page/videos/364092864516252/
10. Translated from Arabic
https://www.facebook.com/323675788266292/photos/a.3248967248
10865/358887024745168/?type=3&theater
11. Interview by Ester Sigillò with a person who voted for Ennahdha 
in 2011 and 2014 elections and for Itilaf al-Karama in 2019 elections, 
Tunis, October 2019. 
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Conservative demands include passing a new law of 
awqaf (state religious endowments), the creation of a 
centralized zakat fund,12 as well as – albeit more margin-
ally – old tropes such as the unity of Maghreb countries13 
and the liberation of Palestine, with Jerusalem as its capi-
tal.14 The coalition platform generally takes a favourable 
position toward conservative constituencies, for example 
by criticizing the “S-17” security procedure forbidding 
14.500 Tunisian people suspected of sympathy with 
Jihadi groups to leave the country15 as well as the recent 
ban of niqab in public administrations as an inefficient 
way of combatting terrorism.16
It is not clear whether Itilaf al-Karama positions itself 
as a possible ally or a challenger of Ennahdha. On the 
one hand, the coalition declares that “Ennahdha is not 
our enemy to fight” and agreed to forge an alliance with 
the Islamist party, on the condition that Ennahdha does 
not unite with Qalb Tounès to form the government – in 
which case Itilaf al-Karama will remain in the opposi-
tion.17 On the other hand, the coalition strongly criticizes 
the Islamist party for having ‘failed to prevent the return 
of the old regime’, materialized by the dissolution of the 
Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution, the Recon-
ciliation law, the party’s alliance with Nidaa Tounès and 
its favoured liberal economic policy – all taken under 
foreign pressure. In contrast, Itilaf al-Karama positions 
itself as “a revolutionary force totally freed from those 
constraints”18 and intends to offer a political alterna-

















The Tunisian 2019 legislative elections posed new chal-
lenges to a political system based on a compromise 
between Islamist and Secular forces, with widespread 
discontent simmering among the population. Electoral 
results, in particular, showed the emergence of new polit-
ical forces challenging Ennahdha, which was considered 
as incapable of achieving the revolutionary benchmarks 
after 2011. 
Analysts mainly focused on Ennahda’s ideological trans-
formation as the main cause of a generalized discontent, 
warning about the possible rise of a radical Islamist alter-
native. Itilafal-Karama has been considered so far as the 
embodiment of this challenge. However, as demonstrated 
in our analysis, the new political coalition is made up of 
a heterogeneous public which goes beyond an Islamist 
political agenda. Indeed, the main reference of Itilaf al-
Karama’s members relies on the rupture with the old 
regime socio-economic and cultural system, rather than 
an exacerbation of religious ideology. 
Therefore, the binary analytical grid “Islamists vs. Secu-
larists” and the exclusive focus on Ennahda’s ideological 
transformation, appear heuristically limited in order to 
interpret the Tunisian political landscape after the 2019 
elections. The latter, indeed, is characterized by the emer-
gence of new political actors putting forward ‘secular’ 
political demands and mobilizing according to trans-ide-
ological logics. As observed, Itilaf al-Karama represents 
an exemplary case, as it positions itself at the crossroad of 
sovereigntist claims and cultural conservatism. 
Consequently, policy-makers should not perceive the 
rise of new political challengers as the result of Ennah-
dha’s ideological transformation but rather as the conse-
quence of a highly contested ‘elite consensus’ trumping 
revolutionary grievances. The increasing poverty and 
the youth unemployment crisis, which ignited the rev-
olution in 2011, continues to cyclically spread tensions 
erupting into mass protests in most marginalized areas 
of the country and overflowing to the peripheries of the 
capital. The stability of the country will depend primarily 
on the government’s ability to address the pressing socio-
economic issues in a context of FMI-imposed austerity 
measures and high public deficit. 
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